Collective Bargaining Agreements

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss issues surrounding collective bargaining agreements. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar, 482 U. S. at 393, 107 S. Ct. 2425. Complete preemption occurs when the "pre-emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has identified only three statutes as having the requisite "preemptive force" to support complete preemption, one of which is § 301 of the LMRA. Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005). Section 301 provides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U. S. C. § 185(a). Section 301 preemption serves to "ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U. S. 399, 404, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed.2d 410 (1988). Section 301 "governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Caterpillar, 482 U. S. at 394, 107 S. Ct. 2425. Thus, when resolution of a state law claim is "substantially dependent" upon or "inextricably intertwined" with analysis of the terms of a CBA, the state law claim "must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, 213, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed.2d 206 (1985) (citation omitted). When, on the other hand, a plaintiff covered by a CBA asserts "legal rights independent of that agreement," preemption does not occur. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U. S. at 396, 107 S. Ct. 2425. A state-law claim is "independent" when resolving it "does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Lingle, 486 U. S. at 407, 108 S. Ct. 1877. This rule ensures that § 301 is not "read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 123, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed.2d 93 (1994); see also Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Grp., 127 F.3d 229, 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1997) (state law negligent misrepresentation claims not preempted by § 301 because they rested on independent state law rights that did not require interpretation of CBA and "[s]tate law-not the CBA- [was] the source of the rights asserted by the plaintiffs"). That a court may need to consult the CBA in resolving the state law claim-to compute damages, for instance- does not subject that claim to preemption by § 301. Livadas, 512 U. S. at 125, 114 S. Ct. 2068; accord Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("simple reference to the face of the CBA" does not require preemption). "The boundary between claims requiring 'interpretation' of a CBA and ones that merely require such an agreement to be 'consulted' is elusive." Wynn, 273 F.3d at 158. Whitehurst v. 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers, 928 F. 3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2019).